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Abstract
Autonomous and semi-autonomous systems for safety-critical applications require rigor-
ous testing before deployment. Due to the complexity of these systems, formal verification
may be impossible and real-world testing may be dangerous during development. Therefore,
simulation-based techniques have been developed that treat the system under test as a black
box during testing. Safety validation tasks include finding disturbances to the system that
cause it to fail (falsification), finding the most-likely failure, and estimating the probability
that the system fails. Motivated by the prevalence of safety-critical artificial intelligence,
this work provides a survey of state-of-the-art safety validation techniques with a focus on
applied algorithms and their modifications for the safety validation problem. We present
and discuss algorithms in the domains of optimization, path planning, reinforcement learn-
ing, and importance sampling. Problem decomposition techniques are presented to help
scale algorithms to large state spaces, and a brief overview of safety-critical applications is
given, including autonomous vehicles and aircraft collision avoidance systems. Finally, we
present a survey of existing academic and commercially available safety validation tools.
Keywords: Safety Validation, Falsification, Optimization, Path Planning, Reinforcement
Learning, Cyber-Physical Systems
1. Introduction
Increasing levels of autonomy promise to revolutionize industries such as automotive trans-
portation [1] and aviation [2], [3] by improving convenience and efficiency while lowering
cost. Innovations have been driven by recent progress in artificial intelligence, particularly
in machine learning [4], [5] and planning [6], [7]. Machine learning has recently achieved
human-competitive performance in board games [8], [9], video games [10], [11], and visual
perception [12], [13]. However, applying machine learning technologies to safety-critical do-
mains has been challenging. Safety-critical systems differ from other systems in that their
failures can have serious consequences, such as loss of life and property. As a result, these
systems must undergo extensive validation and testing prior to certification and deployment.
Safety validation is the process of ensuring the correct and safe operation of a system
operating in an environment. The desired system behavior is defined through a specifica-
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tion, and a failure is any violation of that specification. Typically, simulation is used to find
failures of a system caused by disturbances in the the environment, and a model of the dis-
turbances can then be used to determine the probability of failure. A system is deemed safe
if no failure has been found after adequate exploration of the space of possible disturbances,
or if the probability of failure is found to be below an acceptable threshold. The procedure
of proving that a system is safe to all disturbances is known as verification [14]–[18] and is
outside the scope of this survey.
In this paper, we focus on cyber-physical systems, which involve software and physical
systems interacting over time. This broad definition includes systems such as robots, cars,
aircraft, and planetary rovers. There are several reasons why validating cyber-physical
systems is challenging. First, many of these systems contain complex components, including
those produced by machine learning. The safety properties of these systems may not be well-
understood and subtle and emergent failures can go undetected [19]. Second, many systems,
such as autonomous cars and aircraft, interact with complex and stochastic environments
that are difficult to model. Third, safety properties are generally defined over both the
system under test and its environment. For example, the requirement that “the test vehicle
shall not collide with pedestrians” involves both the system under test (test vehicle) and
actors in its environment (pedestrians). As a result, safety validation must be performed
over the combined system. Fourth, sequential interactions between the system and the
environment means that failure scenarios are trajectories over time. Naively searching over
trajectories leads to an exponential analysis space in time. Finally, safety validation is often
applied to mature safety-critical systems in the late stages of development, where failures
can be extremely rare.
Traditional methods for ensuring safety, through safety processes, engineering analysis,
and conventional testing, though necessary, do not scale to the complexity of next-generation
systems. Advanced validation techniques are needed to build confidence in these systems.
Many validation approaches have been proposed in the literature. They can be broadly cat-
egorized by the information they use for analysis. White-box methods use knowledge of the
internals of the system. For example, formal verification in the form of model checking [14],
[15] and automated theorem proving [16]–[18], represents the system using mathematical
models. Because the model is known, formal verification methods can find failure examples
when they exist or prove the absence of failures when they do not. However, because for-
mal verification considers all execution possibilities, it often has difficulty scaling to large
problems.
In contrast to white-box methods, black-box techniques do not assume that the internals
of the system are known. They consider a general mapping from input to output that can
be sampled. Owing to the generality of the system description, black-box methods can be
applied to analyze a much broader class of systems. However, the reliance on sampling
means that black-box methods can generally never (in a finite number of samples) provide
complete coverage and prove the absence of failures. Instead, black-box methods generally
aim to quickly and efficiently find failure examples. While one can never conclude that a
failure cannot exist, confidence in the system can increase with additional sampling. Due to
its flexibility and scalability, black-box validation is often the only feasible option for large
complex systems, and is the focus of this survey.
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We consider three safety validation tasks for a system with specifications. First, fal-
sification aims to find an example disturbance in the environment that causes the system
to violate the specification. This formulation is useful for discovering previously unknown
failure modes and finding regions where the system can operate safely. The second safety
validation task is to find the most-likely failure according to a probabilistic model of the
disturbances. The model can be created through expert knowledge or data to reflect the
probabilities in the real environment. The third safety validation task is to estimate the
probability that a failure will occur. Failure probability estimation is important for the
acceptance and certification of autonomous systems.
There are many algorithms that have been used for these safety validation tasks. This
survey categorizes and presents many of them. Falsification and most-likely failure analysis
are related tasks, in that they involve finding failures of an autonomous system. Categories
of algorithms that are suited for these tasks include optimization, path planning, and rein-
forcement learning. In optimization, we seek to find a trajectory of disturbances that cause
the system to fail. In path planning, we use the environment’s state to aid in the exploration
of possible failure modes. In reinforcement learning, we frame the problem as a Markov de-
cision process and search for a policy that maps environment states to disturbances that
cause the system to fail. When the goal is to estimate the probability of failure and fail-
ures are rare, we can use techniques such as importance sampling to generate scenarios and
translate their results into a probability estimate. For all of the safety validation tasks, a
major challenge is scalability. We present several problem-decomposition techniques that
can allow for better scalability of the presented algorithms.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces notation and the problem formu-
lations of the three safety validation tasks. Section 3 demonstrates how to frame falsification
and most-likely failure analysis as optimization problems and presents several algorithms for
solving them efficiently. Section 4 describes how to use the environment state to find fail-
ures of the system through several path-planning algorithms. Section 5 shows how to frame
falsification and most-likely failure analysis as a Markov decision processes and presents
several reinforcement learning algorithms to solve them. Section 6 introduces importance
sampling and describes some algorithms that are used to estimate the probability of fail-
ure. Section 7 presents several ways to address problem scalability through decomposition.
Section 8 surveys the various applications and discusses common strategies and adaptations
of approaches for each domain. Finally, section 9 surveys existing tools in the literature and
compares their basic features.
2. Preliminaries
This section first presents notation used to define the safety validation tasks and describe
the safety validation algorithms. We then define three different safety validation tasks:
falsification, most-likely failure analysis, and failure probability estimation.
2.1 Notation
Suppose we have a system under test (referred to as the system) that takes actions a ∈ A
in an environment with state s ∈ S. Actions are selected based on observations o ∈ O
of the environment. The system interacts with the environment over discrete time t ∈
3
Corso, Moss, Koren, Lee, Kochenderfer
System
M
Environment
E
Adversary
A
action a disturbance x
observation o state s
Figure 1: Model of the safety validation problem.
{1, . . . , tmax}. We denote a state trajectory up to time t as s1:t = [s1, . . . , st], an observation
trajectory o1:t = [o1, . . . , ot], and an action trajectory a1:t = [a1, . . . , at]. The system may
be modeled by a function M that maps an observation trajectory to an action
at =M(o1:t). (1)
An adversary A produces disturbances x ∈ X ⊆ Rn in the environment with the goal of
causing the system to fail. A disturbance trajectory is denoted x1:t or just x. The adversary
can use full or partial knowledge of the environment state to determine the next disturbance
such that
xt = A(s1:t). (2)
The environment state evolves over time and is influenced by the actions of the system
and the disturbances from the adversary. The environment is modeled by E , where
st+1, ot+1 = E(a1:t,x1:t). (3)
The interaction between the system, the environment, and the adversary is depicted in fig. 1.
Some safety validation tasks require that the environment has a model of the distur-
bances. Let p(x) be the probability density of the disturbance trajectory x. If the distur-
bances are independent across time, then it is sufficient to define the density over a single
disturbance p(x), or if the disturbances depend only on the state it is sufficient to define
p(x | s). The disturbance model can be constructed through expert knowledge or learned
from data.
In this work, we assume that the environment and the system are fixed, making distur-
bances the only way to affect the system. Therefore, from the point of view of the adversary,
the system and environment can be combined into a single function f that maps disturbance
trajectories into state trajectories
s = f(x). (4)
Some algorithms require the ability to simulate a disturbance xt for a single timestep from
a state st. We denote the simulation step
st+1 = f(st, xt). (5)
The desired operation of the system is described by one or more specifications ψ which
are written in a formal specification language such as temporal logic [20] or designed ad hoc.
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We overload the notation ψ to be the set of state trajectories that satisfy the specification
and write s ∈ ψ when the state trajectory satisfies the specification and s 6∈ ψ when s
violates the specification.
2.2 Problem Formulation
The focus of this work is the safety validation of black-box systems. Safety validation is
the process of discovering which disturbances x cause the system to behave improperly and
how frequently they occur. Answering these questions gives insight into the safety of the
system. A system is a black box if the functionM is not known or too complex to explicitly
reason about. A white-box system can be described analytically or specified in a formal
modeling language. Some white-box systems may be treated as a black box if knowledge of
their design does not help the validation process. For example, while small neural networks
can have properties formally verified [21], large neural networks with millions or billions of
parameters are generally too large for white-box verification techniques. Gray-box systems
usually provide some knowledge of their underlying structure without describing it entirely.
Some gray-box safety validation techniques are included in this survey due to their broad
applicability.
Three safety validation tasks are considered in this work and are defined below.
Falsification. Falsification is the process of finding a disturbance trajectory that causes
the outputs to violate a specification ψ. Such a trajectory is known as a counterexample,
failure trajectory, or falsifying trajectory. We want to find
x s.t. f(x) 6∈ ψ. (6)
Most-Likely Failure Analysis. Most-likely failure analysis tries to find the failure tra-
jectory with maximum likelihood. We want to solve
argmax
x
p(x) s.t. f(x) 6∈ ψ. (7)
Failure Probability Estimation. Failure probability estimation tries to compute the
probability that a specification will be violated. We want to compute the expectation
Pfail = E [1{f(x) 6∈ ψ}] , (8)
3. Optimization
A naive approach to falsification is to search randomly over disturbance trajectories until a
counterexample is discovered. If counterexamples are rare, this process can be inefficient.
To help guide the search for counterexamples, we can define a cost function cstate(s) that
measures the level of safety of the system over the state trajectory s. A well-designed cost
function will help bias the search over disturbance trajectories toward those that are less
safe. Additionally, if the goal is to find the most-likely failure, then the cost function can
incorporate the likelihood of the disturbance trajectory.
Once a cost function is defined, falsification and most-likely failure analysis become
optimization problems where we seek to minimize the cost with respect to the disturbance
5
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trajectory x. We define the optimization problem as
x
∗ = argmin
x
c(x), (9)
where c(x) = cstate(f(x)). The cost function is designed such that c(x) ≥ ǫ ⇐⇒ f(x) ∈ ψ,
where ǫ is a safety threshold. Therefore, if a disturbance x causes c(x) < ǫ, then x is a
counterexample.
The design of the cost function c is specific to the application. Consider the safety
validation of an autonomous vehicle that has a specification to not collide with other vehicles.
The cost function could be the distance at the point of closest approach (i.e. miss distance)
between the system and any other vehicle. The smaller the value, the closer the system is to
a collision. If the distance is less than a safety threshold, then a collision has occurred [22].
When the specification is represented by a temporal logic expression, a common choice
for c is the temporal logic robustness ρ(s, ψ). The robustness is a measure of the degree
to which the trajectory s satisfies the specification ψ. Large values of robustness mean
that at no point does the trajectory come close to violating the specification, while low but
positive values of robustness mean that the trajectory is close to violating the specification.
A robustness value less than 0 means that the specification has been violated and gives an
indication of by how much. The robustness for space-time signals can be computed from a
recursive definition [23]–[25]. Upper and lower bounds on robustness can be computed for
incomplete signals [26], which is useful when constructing a trajectory sequentially [26], [27].
The derivative of the robustness with respect to the state trajectory can be approximated,
which may help derive gradient-driven optimization algorithms [28]. Causal information
in the form of a Bayesian network can be incorporated into the robustness for improved
falsification [29].
One drawback to using robustness as a cost is that it depends on the scale of the state
values. If the units of one state variable cause it to be much larger than another (i.e. engine
RPMs versus angular rotation in radians), then the contribution to the robustness will favor
the larger variable. The state variables may be normalized, but this requires the range of
the state variables which may not be known. To mitigate this problem, Zhang, Hasuo, and
Arcaini [30] proposed measuring the robustness of each state variable independently and
using a multi-armed bandit algorithm to decide which robustness value to optimize on each
iteration.
When the safety validation task is to find the most-likely failure, we can modify the cost
function to include the likelihood of the disturbance trajectory p(x). One option is to define
a multiobjective cost function c′(x) defined as
c′(x) = c(x)− λp(x), (10)
where λ > 0 is user-defined. Alternatively, we can consider a piecewise objective that only
considers the likelihood when the disturbance trajectory leads to a failure:
c′(x) =
{
c(x) if c(x) ≥ ǫ
−p(x) if c(x) < ǫ.
(11)
Formulating safety validation as an optimization problem allows for the use of many
existing optimization algorithms (see Kochenderfer and Wheeler [31] for an overview). Due
6
A Survey of Algorithms for Black-Box Safety Validation
to the complexity of many autonomous systems and environments, the optimization prob-
lem is generally non-convex and can have many local minima. Therefore, algorithms that
can escape local minima and have adequate exploration over the space of disturbance tra-
jectories are preferred. Two algorithms that have been used in falsification software [32],
[33] (see section 9 for more details) are covariance matrix adaptation evolution strategy
(CMA-ES) [34] and globalized Nelder-Mead (GNM) [35], both of which are effective for
global optimization. Another way to escape local minima is to combine global and local
search [36]–[38], where one optimization routine is used to explore the space of disturbances
trajectories to find regions of interest, and another algorithm does local optimization to find
the best disturbance trajectory in a region.
This section describes algorithms that have had success for falsification. The algorithms
included are those that have been designed explicitly for, or have been modified to work
with, black-box falsification. The basic version of each algorithm is described, and where
applicable, the variations of the algorithm are discussed.
3.1 Simulated Annealing
An approach to stochastic global optimization known as simulated annealing (SA) uses a
random walk around the disturbance space to minimize a cost function c. A temperature
parameter β is used to control the amount of stochasticity in the method over time and a
transition function T (x′ | x) describes the probability distribution over the next disturbance
trajectory x′. Due to the stochastic nature of simulated annealing, it is often a suitable algo-
rithm for solving a global optimization problem with many local minima and can therefore
be effective for falsification [39]–[41].
The basic approach is presented in algorithm 1. It begins by selecting a random starting
disturbance trajectory x (line 2). At each iteration, a new disturbance trajectory x′ is
sampled from T (x′ | x) (line 4). If the new trajectory is a counterexample, then it is returned
(line 6), otherwise it is subjected to an acceptance test with probability exp(−β(c(x′)−c(x)))
(line 7). If x′ is accepted, then it replaces x, otherwise x is left unchanged. The procedure
repeats until the computational budget is exhausted.
Algorithm 1 Simulated Annealing
1: function SimulatedAnnealing(β, T , c, ǫ)
2: Sample initial x
3: loop
4: x′ ∼ T (x′ | x)
5: if c(x′) < ǫ
6: return x′
7: if UniformRand() < exp(−β(c(x′)− c(x)))
8: x← x′
The main design choices when using simulated annealing are the annealing temperature
β the choice of the transition function T . The annealing temperature can be adjusted based
on the number of accepted and rejected disturbance trajectories. A typical choice is to
adjust β so that the next point is accepted approximately half of the time [39].
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A common choice for transition function is to use a Gaussian distribution around the
current point x with a standard deviation that is adjusted based on the ratio of accepted
points [31]. This approach may not work well when the disturbance space has constraints
that must be satisfied, such as lower and upper bounds on the possible disturbances [39].
Abbas et al. [39] proposes the use of a hit and run approach to transitioning that respects
constraints [39]. It follows 3 steps:
1. Sample a random direction d in the disturbance trajectory space.
2. Perform a line search in the direction of d to determine the range of α such that x+αd
does not violate any constraints.
3. Sample α from this range according to a chosen distribution. The standard deviation
of this distribution can be adjusted using the acceptance ratio to improve convergence.
Aerts et al. [40] improved the hit and run scheme by suggesting that α be chosen for each
disturbance dimension separately so that highly constrained dimensions do not restrict the
step size of less constrained dimensions [40].
In the basic SA algorithm, the size of x remains fixed throughout the optimization,
meaning the temporal discretization of the disturbance trajectory is never adjusted. Aerts
et al. [40] note that the frequency content of the disturbance trajectory is salient for some
falsification problems, and therefore the temporal discretization of the disturbance trajectory
should itself be optimized. An approach called input-signal-space optimization uses a two-
layered approach, where an outer loop uses SA to select the length of the disturbance
trajectory, and an inner loop finds the lowest cost trajectory for that length. This approach
is able to adapt the fidelity of the time domain, getting improved results for some falsification
problems [40].
3.2 Genetic Algorithms
Genetic algorithms (GA) approach global optimization by mimicking the biological process
of evolution and have been previously applied to falsification [42], [43]. The algorithm starts
by sampling a population of individuals (disturbance trajectories) {x(1), . . . ,x(N)} and then
iterates over the following steps:
1. Selection: Pairs of individuals are chosen to produce the next generation. The pairs
are typically chosen to be among the lowest-cost individuals.
2. Crossover: The selected pairs produce new trajectories by combining their features
using a crossover function.
3. Mutation: Some of the new individuals are randomly modified to incorporate new
traits into the population.
Zhao, Krogh, and Hubbard [42] applied a genetic algorithm to generate test cases for
embedded control systems. Each individual is represented by a real-valued vector for all
continuous variables and a binary encoding for all discrete variables. Selection occurs with
a probability inversely related to the cost function. The crossover between x(1) and x(2) is
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done using one of three mechanisms. The first is simple crossover where a random time t is
chosen and the crossover disturbance trajectory is
xnew =
[
x
(1)
1:t x
(2)
(t+1):tmax
]
, (12)
where the square brackets indicate concatenation. The second is an arithmetic crossover
where
xnew = (1− λ)x
(1) + λx(2) (13)
for some value of λ ∈ [0, 1]. Zhao, Krogh, and Hubbard [42] perform crossover with
xnew = min(max(x
(1) ± λx(2),xlow),xhigh), (14)
where xlow and xhigh are the lower and upper bounds of the disturbance space. Mutation is
performed by selecting a random position in xnew and filling in a new value from x ∈ X.
3.3 Bayesian Optimization
In Bayesian optimization [44], we maintain a probabilistic surrogate model of the cost func-
tion over the space of disturbance trajectories. We use the model to select disturbance
trajectories that are likely to lower the cost function. Maintaining a surrogate model can
be beneficial when evaluations of c(x) are costly. Since the surrogate model is probabilis-
tic, it naturally handles stochastic objective functions and uncertainty. For these reasons,
Bayesian optimization is a natural choice for falsification [29], [45]–[47].
A common choice of surrogate model is the Gaussian process (GP), which is a distribution
over functions. GPs are popular because they can model complex functions and infer the
costs of unexplored regions of the disturbance space based on previous sample points [31].
Gaussian processes are parameterized by a mean function, a kernel function, and a model
of the noise in the cost function. For notational convenience, all of these parameters will
be grouped into θ, which can be specified or learned from data using maximum likelihood
estimation [31].
The basic approach is outlined in algorithm 2. It takes as input the initial GP parameters
θ. A set of previous disturbance trajectories and their costs are each initialized to the
empty set (line 2). On each iteration, the Gaussian process model is updated based on the
parameters and all of the trajectories and costs seen so far (line 4). The GP is used to
get estimates of the mean and uncertainty of the cost function over the disturbance space
(line 5) and those estimates are used to determine the next sample point (line 6). If a
counterexample is found, return it, otherwise add the new trajectory and associated cost to
dataset (line 9). Lastly, the parameters can optionally be fit using the data seen so far (line
10).
The OptimalDisturbance function searches with respect to a particular metric. Ex-
amples of metrics include [31]:
• Prediction-based exploration: The value of the predicted mean µˆ is minimized.
• Error-based exploration: The value of the standard deviation σˆ is maximized.
• Lower confidence bound exploration: The value of the lower confidence bound (µˆ−ασˆ
for some α > 0) is minimized.
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Algorithm 2 Bayesian Optimization
1: function BayesianOptimization(θ, c, ǫ)
2: data ← ∅
3: loop
4: GP ← ConstructGP(θ, data)
5: µˆ(x), σˆ(x)← Model(GP )
6: xnew ← OptimalDisturbance(µˆ, σˆ)
7: if c(xnew) < ǫ
8: return xnew
9: data ← data ∪ {(xnew, c(xnew))}
10: θ ← Fit(GP , data)
• Probability of improvement: If cmin is the lowest cost so far then P (c < cmin) is
maximized.
• Expected improvement exploration: The expected improvement Eµˆ,σˆ[I(c)] is maxi-
mized, where the improvement is defined as:
I(c) =
{
cmin − c if c < cmin
0 otherwise.
(15)
The search for the optimal disturbance can be conducted using an optimization routine such
as simulated annealing [29] or a sampling plan with good coverage of the space of disturbance
trajectories [47].
One drawback to using Gaussian processes is their inability to scale to large dimensions
and many sample points. To improve scalability for falsification, Mathesen et al. [36] in-
troduced an algorithm called stochastic optimization with adaptive restarts (SOAR) that
uses a two-layered Bayesian optimization approach combined with simulated annealing. A
Gaussian process model is maintained over the global search space, and a stochastic method
is used to select regions for further exploration. Local Gaussian process models are used for
refined searching of local regions. When a local region is no longer seeing improvement, a
new region is selected.
3.4 Extended Ant-Colony Optimization
Ant colony optimization is a probabilistic technique initially used for finding optimal paths
through graphs [48]. The algorithm is inspired by the exploration strategy used by some
ant species, where ants leave traces of pheromone when searching for food. The presence of
pheromone makes it more likely for an ant to follow a path, but the pheromone evaporates
over time.
Ant colony optimization was extended to continuous spaces by Fainekos and Gian-
nakoglou [49] and later applied to falsification [50]. Extended ant-colony optimization is
presented in algorithm 3. Finding the optimal disturbance trajectory x is formulated as
a graph-traversal problem. Edges in the graph exist between adjacent temporal points
(xt, xt+1). At each time t, the space of disturbances is discretized into N equally spaced
10
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cells, each with a center point µit for integer i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Ants traverse the graph (line
5) by selecting their next cell i at time t based on the amount of pheromone present τit
(initialized to a constant τ0 in line 2). The probability of selecting a cell is
P (i | t) =
τit∑
j τjt
. (16)
Once a cell is selected, a random point xit is selected uniformly at random from within it.
The process continues for each ant until it reaches the end of the trajectory at tmax. At
the end of a disturbance trajectory, if it is a counterexample then it can be returned (line
6). After each of M ants has completed a full disturbance trajectory, the pheromones are
updated (line 8) through evaporation with rate ρ, and deposition as
τit ← (1− ρ)τit︸ ︷︷ ︸
evaporation
+
M∑
k=1
exp(−‖x
(k)
t − µit‖
2/α)
β + c(x(k))︸ ︷︷ ︸
deposition
(17)
where x
(k)
t is the disturbance of ant k at time t, c(x
(k)) is the cost of the full disturbance
trajectory of ant k, and α and β are user-defined constants.
Algorithm 3 Extended Ant Colony Optimization
1: function ExtendedAntColony(τ0 , µit, ρ, α, β, c, ǫ)
2: τit ← τ0 for all i and t
3: loop
4: for k ∈ 1 : M
5: x(k) ← RunAnt(τit)
6: if c(x(k)) < ǫ
7: return x(k)
8: τit ← UpdatePheromone(τit, µit,x
(k), ρ, α, β)
3.5 Interpretable Falsification with Genetic Programming
Corso and Kochenderfer [51] approach falsification and most-likely failure analysis with the
idea that counterexamples can often be described by simple temporal logic specifications
on the disturbance trajectory. A specifications ϕ is sampled from a grammar with a bias
toward simpler statements. It is optimized with the goal of finding a specification such that
if a disturbance trajectory satisfies it, then that trajectory causes the system to fail, i.e.
x ∈ ϕ =⇒ c(x) < ǫ. (18)
The approach is outlined in algorithm 4. It starts by sampling a set of M disturbance
specifications from a temporal logic grammar GTL (line 2). Specifications are represented by
a tree, and the sampling procedure involves iteratively expanding each non-terminal node
in the tree with a production rule from the grammar, chosen uniformly at random. This
sampling scheme induces a distribution over specifications where more complex specifications
are significantly less likely to be sampled.
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For each specification we estimate the average cost of disturbance trajectories that satisfy
it by taking the mean of N samples (lines 5 and 6). This sampling is done by converting the
specification into a set of inequality constraints on the disturbance trajectory [51], and then
sampling from p(x) subject to those constraints. Inequality constraints can easily be applied
when the components of x are independent or when the joint distribution is multivariate
Gaussian [51]. For more complex distributions, rejection sampling could be used, but may
not scale to high dimensions.
If a specification has a sufficiently small average cost, then return it (line 8), otherwise,
update the specifications using genetic programming by performing selection, crossover, and
mutation (line 9 to 11). In selection, the highest performing specifications are chosen to
produce the next generation. In crossover, a new specification is constructed from two se-
lected parent specifications. The subtree from a random node in the first parent replaces the
subtree at a random node of the second parent. In mutation, the specification is altered by
randomly replacing a subtree with a new rule, or permuting the subtrees already present [31].
The result of algorithm 4 is a specification that describes the types of disturbances that cause
the system to fail. It has been shown to be effective at finding counterexamples as well as
giving engineering insight into the failure modes of the system.
Algorithm 4 Interpretable Falsification with Genetic Programming
1: function InterpretableFalsification(GTL , c, ǫ)
2: Sample {ϕ1, . . . , ϕM} from GTL
3: loop
4: for each specification ϕj
5: Sample {x1, . . . ,xN} from p(x) s.t. xi ∈ ϕj
6: cϕj ←
1
N
∑N
i=1 c(xi)
7: if any cϕj < ǫ
8: return ϕj
9: Select new specifications {ϕ1, . . . , ϕM} based on cϕj
10: Crossover specifications
11: Mutate specifications
4. Path Planning
Falsification may be framed as a path planning problem through the state space of the en-
vironment using the disturbances as control inputs. In path planning, there is an initial
state s0 and a set of failure states Sfail that we seek to reach by sequentially construct-
ing a disturbance trajectory x. The benefits to a path planning approach are the use of
state information to guide the choice of disturbance and the ability to reuse partial trajec-
tory segments. For a discussion of general path planning algorithms see the overview by
LaValle [52]
The first path planning algorithm covered is rapidly exploring random tree (RRT) which
has many variants that have been used for falsification. The RRT algorithm attempts to
cover the state space by building a space-filling tree, making it a natural approach for finding
counterexamples. The next algorithm discussed is a multiple shooting method that frames
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falsification as a graph traversal problem over a discretized state space. The discretization is
iteratively refined so computation is only spent in promising regions. Lastly, we present Las
Vegas tree search which constructs a tree of disturbances from a predefined set of trajectory
segments.
4.1 Rapidly Exploring Random Tree
Rapidly-exploring random tree (RRT) is a path planning technique for efficiently finding
failure trajectories [53]. A space-filling tree is iteratively constructed by sampling the state
space and growing in the direction of unexplored regions. RRT has been applied to the
falsification of black-box systems [26], [54]–[61].
Algorithm 5 Rapidly-exploring random tree
1: function RRT(s0, Sfail)
2: T ← InitializeTree(s0)
3: loop
4: sgoal ← SampleState()
5: snear ← NearestNeighbor(T , sgoal)
6: xnew ← GetDisturbance(snear , sgoal)
7: snew ← f(snear, xnew)
8: AddNode(T , snear, snew)
9: return CounterExamples(T , Sfail)
The basic approach is presented in algorithm 5. On each iteration, a random point in
the state space sgoal is generated, which acts as the goal state for the next node to be added
(line 4). The tree is searched for the node that is closest to the goal state snear (line 5) based
on some distance metric d. This node will act as the starting point when attempting to
reach the goal. A disturbance xnew is generated that drives snear toward sgoal (line 6). Since
the system is a black-box, we cannot generally determine an xnew that causes snear = sgoal
exactly. Instead we can use random sampling of xnew or a more advanced optimization
procedure to get as close as possible. Lastly, the disturbance xnew is simulated, starting
from snear, resulting in a new state snew (line 7) which is then added to the tree as a child
of snear (line 8). Note that if the simulator cannot be initialized to any state, then the trace
can be simulated by starting at the root and simulating the disturbances through the branch
containing snear. The algorithm stops when the maximum number of iterations is reached, a
suitable falsifying trajectory is found, or tree coverage reaches a specified threshold. Variants
of RRT [26], [54]–[58], [60], [61] typically differ in their approach to state space sampling,
choice of distance metric for nearest neighbor selection, or by adding additional steps that
reconfigure the tree for improved performance.
Coverage Metrics and Stopping Criteria. Informally, the tree coverage C(T ) in the
state space S is the degree to which T represents S. One of the first coverage metrics to be
used with RRT falsification is based on the notion of dispersion [54]. For a distance metric
between states d, the dispersion is the radius of the largest ball in S that contains no points
in T , i.e. maxs∈S minsi∈T d(s, si). Dispersion is challenging to compute in many dimensions
and can be overly conservative [54]. Instead, a coverage metric based on average dispersion
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can be computed on a grid with n points and a spacing of δ as
Cdisp(T ) = 1−
1
δ
n∑
i=1
min (dj(T, δ))
n
, (19)
where dj(T ) is the shortest distance from grid point j to any node in T according to the
metric d [54]. The value min(dj , δ) is therefore the radius of the largest ball that can sit
at grid point j and not touch any nodes in the tree or another grid point. Note that
Cdisp → 1 when the tree contains nodes at each grid point. The coverage is therefore related
to the fidelity of the grid, with a finer grid giving a more comprehensive value at greater
computational expense.
Another coverage metric that has been used more recently is star discrepancy, which
measures how evenly a set of points is distributed [26], [57], [58]. The discrepancy D of a
tree over a region B ⊆ S is
D(T,B) =
|T ∩B|
|T |
−
vol (B)
vol (S)
, (20)
where vol is the volume of a region and |T | is the number of nodes in the tree. The first
term is the fraction of the tree nodes that are in B and the second term is the ratio of the
volume of B to the volume of S. The star discrepancy D∗ is the largest discrepancy over all
possible subregions of S
D∗(T ) = max
B
D(T,B). (21)
Note that D∗ → 0 when all subregions of S have their “fair share” of the sample points
based on volume, and D∗ → 1 when all the sample points overlap. To turn discrepancy into
a coverage metric, we may define
Cdisc(T,B) = 1−D(T,B) (22)
and
Cstar(T ) = 1−D
∗(T ). (23)
Since S is continuous and we must maximize over all possible subregions, Cstar is challenging
to compute. Instead, it is possible to approximate it using a finite partitioning of the state
space into regions {B1, . . . , Bn} such that ∪
n
i=1Bi = S. The discrepancy coverage can
be computed for each box Cdisc(T ∩ Bi, Bi) [26] or a lower and upper bound of the star
discrepancy coverage can be computed based on Bi [58], [62].
For path planning problems in robotics (for which the RRT algorithm was first devel-
oped), the system is generally controllable meaning the reachable set of states is the entire
state space and the growth of the tree can be terminated when a coverage metric exceeds
a chosen threshold. When applying RRT to the problem of falsification, it is often the case
that the system is not controllable by the disturbances so the reachable set is a subset of
S [54]. In this case, a coverage metric may never exceed the needed threshold. To mitigate
this problem, Esposito, Kim, and Kumar [54] proposed a growth metric on the tree defined
as
g(T ) = dC(T )/d|T |. (24)
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The tree growth measures how much the coverage metric increases with the increase in nodes
in the tree. In addition to stopping based on adequate coverage, the tree can be terminated
if the growth is below a specified threshold, suggesting that adding more nodes to the tree
will not improve the coverage.
Adaptive Sampling. When the reachable set is only a subset of the state space a uniform
sampling of goal states may be inefficient, leading to slow tree growth and low coverage
values. There are several techniques for biasing goal samples toward the reachable set.
An approach known as guided-RRT (g-RRT) [58] biases the selection of sgoal to regions
with low coverage. In g-RRT, the state space is segmented into n regions {B1, . . . , Bn}
and each region is assigned a weight w(Bi). To sample sgoal, we start by sampling a region
according to
P (Bgoal = Bi) =
w(Bi)∑
j w(Bj)
, (25)
and then sgoal is sampled uniformly from Bgoal. In the original version of g-RRT [57], [58],
the weight w(Bi) is related to the increase in the lower and upper bounds of Cstar when a
new point is added to Bi. In later work [26], the weight is w(Bi) = σ(D(T,Bi)), where σ is
the sigmoid function. The goal in both cases is to sample points that increase the coverage
of the tree.
Kim, Esposito, and Kumar [55] maintain a distribution over sgoal that has a mean biased
toward low values of the cost function and a standard deviation that adaptively changes to
maximize sampling in the reachable set. As the algorithm progresses, they keep track of the
ratio of successful expansions of the tree β. A successful expansion is one where
d(snew, sgoal) > d(snear, sgoal), (26)
meaning the tree was able to grow in the direction of sgoal. The ratio β is updated after
a user-specified number of iterations and is used to update the standard deviation between
bounds [σmin, σmax] as
σ = (1− β)(σmax − σmin) + σmin. (27)
Thus, when the number of successful expansions is large, the standard deviation is reduced
to continue sampling in that region, but when the tree frequently cannot grow toward sgoal
the range of values is increased to better search for the reachable set.
Neighbor Selection. The choice of distance metric for finding the nearest neighbor snear
is critical for the performance of RRT. In some applications, it is acceptable to minimize
the Euclidean distance between snear and sgoal [61], but this approach may be insufficient
for some problems. Firstly, Euclidean distance does not take into account whether sgoal
can be reached from snew based on the dynamics of the system. Secondly, if the reachable
set is only a small subset of the state space, points on the boundary of the reachable set
will frequently be chosen as snear, limiting the coverage of the tree. Lastly, if there is a cost
associated with each trajectory, it should be considered when picking which node to expand.
To encode reachability in the selection of node neighbors, Kim, Esposito, and Kumar [55]
uses an estimation of the time to go from snear to sgoal defined by
t(snear, sgoal) =
{
d(snear, sgoal)/v if v > 0
∞ otherwise
, (28)
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where the velocity is
v = max
x∈X
(
−
∂d(s, sgoal)
∂s
f(snear, x)
∣∣∣∣
s=snear
)
. (29)
To compute the derivative ∂d(s, sgoal)/∂s exactly requires white-box knowledge of the sys-
tem, but it could be estimated with domain knowledge or from simulations [55].
Another modification to neighbor selection is known as history-based selection, which
penalizes the selection of nodes that fail to expand [55]. A node fails to expand if it is
selected as snear and creates an output snew that is already in the tree. Failure to expand
typically occurs when snear is on the boundary of the reachable set. The number of times a
node has failed to expand is stored as nf and the distance between nodes is modified as
dh(snear, sj) = d(snear, sj) + λnf (30)
for any choice of distance metric d and a user specified constant λ > 0. Kim, Esposito, and
Kumar [55] chose λ to balance the contribution of d and nj.
To incorporate a state-dependent cost function c(s) into the RRT algorithm, Karaman
and Frazzoli [63] developed the approach known as RRT∗. In RRT∗, the neighbor selection
is done by finding a set Snear of nodes in an ǫ-radius of sgoal and then selecting the node in
Snear that has the lowest cost, i.e.
snear = argmin
si∈Snear
c(si) (31)
where
Snear = {s | d(s, sgoal) < ǫ}. (32)
For the cost function, Dreossi et al. [26] use the partial robustness of the system specification
while Tuncali and Fainekos [60] uses a heuristic cost for autonomous driving.
Other RRT Variants. In the basic version of RRT, a single tree is maintained and
grown until termination, but under some circumstances multiple trees may be used. When
searching over a space of static parameters θ, a different tree can be grown for each choice of
parameter in an approach called rapidly exploring forest of trees (RRFT) [54]. In RRFT, any
tree that has reached a threshold coverage value or has stopped growing will be terminated,
and a new tree (with a new value of θ) is added to the forest. This process continues until
a counterexample is found or until the parameter space has been adequately covered with
fully grown trees. Another example of maintaining multiple trees is the approach of Koschi
et al. [61] where a fixed number of nodes K are added at each iteration, including the first
(so K trees are maintained). Each new node is added to the tree that has the closest node.
Trees that are not being grown can be removed for memory efficiency [61].
Tuncali and Fainekos [60] combined stochastic global optimization techniques with RRT
by including a transition test (similar to algorithm 1) and a similarity test for the addition
of new nodes. New nodes are only added if they pass the transition test (based on their cost
function) and if they are sufficiently different from all of the other nodes in the tree. These
two techniques enhance exploration and coverage of the state space.
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Koschi et al. [61] introduced the backwards algorithm for RRT which connects nodes
in the tree backward in time without breaking the black-box assumption. The algorithm
starts by sampling a state s0 in the failure set. At each iteration, a state is randomly
sampled as sgoal, and the nearest neighbor in the tree snear is determined. A disturbance
is selected that drives sgoal toward snear (notice this is opposite from the basic algorithm),
and a new state snew is generated by simulating f(sgoal, xnew). To maintain continuity in
the tree, snew replaces snear and the entire branch connecting snear to s0 is re-simulated with
the same disturbances. If the resulting state (the new s0) is no longer in the failure set,
then the branch is terminated and the algorithm repeats. This approach, although more
computationally expensive, showed improved performance for finding rare failure events of
an adaptive cruise control system [61]. Note, however, that unlike the basic RRT algorithm,
this approach requires a simulator that can be initialized based only on the observed state
of the environment.
4.2 Multiple Shooting Methods
Multiple shooting methods [64] solve non-linear initial value problems and have been used
for robotic motion planning [65] and falsification [66], [67]. The idea is to sample trajectory
segments using random initial states and random disturbances. A shortest path problem
is solved to find a candidate trajectory through these segments that connects initial states
and failure states, where two segments are connected if the terminal state of one segment is
sufficiently close to the starting state of another. The discovered path may not be feasible
due to the gaps between segments, so an optimization routine is used to find disturbances
that minimize those gaps and find an actual failure trajectory. In most multiple-shooting
algorithms, the procedure to connect trajectory segments involves using white-box informa-
tion such as dynamical equations or gradients [66]. Zutshi et al. [67] developed a version of
multiple shooting that is applicable to black-box falsification that we present here.
There are two ideas that make multiple shooting methods applicable for black-box falsi-
fication in large state spaces [67]:
1. The state space should only be explored around the reachable set.
2. State space discretization and refinement can be used to connect segments.
To achieve this, the state space is implicitly discretized into disjoint cells C, each of size δ.
The cells are not explicitly stored, but they are constructed so it is efficient to find which
cell contains a given state. One efficient representation is a Cartesian grid with a fixed cell
size. The reachable set is estimated by running simulations forward in time with random
disturbances and recording which cells are connected together. The cell connections form a
graph that can be searched for candidate falsifying trajectories. Cells in these trajectories
are refined until an actual counterexample is found. Since the algorithm relies on a graph
search over a discretized grid, it may be useful to provide a set of initial states S0 to have
more than one starting cell.
The approach is presented in algorithm 6. It takes as input a set of initial states S0
and a set of failure states Sfail, a discrete cell size δ, a refinement factor γ, a maximum
number of segments per iteration Nmax, and the number of samples per cell K. A set of
candidate trajectories T is initialized to the empty set (line 2). On each iteration a graph
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Algorithm 6 Multiple Shooting Method
1: function MultipleShooting(S0, Sfail, δ, γ, Nmax, K)
2: T ← ∅
3: loop
4: G← SampleSegments(T, δ,Nmax,K)
5: T ← FindCandidateTrajectories(G,S0, Sfail)
6: if T = ∅
7: return ∅
8: if ActualTrajectories(T ) 6= ∅
9: return ActualTrajectories(T )
10: δ ← γδ
11: function SampleSegments(S0, T , δ, Nmax, K)
12: G← ∅
13: Q← SampleCells(S0, δ)
14: while Q 6= ∅ and |G| < Nmax
15: C ← pop(Q)
16: Sample {s1, . . . sK} uniformly from C
17: Sample {x1, . . . , xK} from p(x)
18: for i ∈ 1 : K
19: snew = f(si, xi)
20: Cnew ← FindCell(snew, δ)
21: if Cnew ∈ T or T = ∅
22: G← G ∪ (C,Cnew, xi)
return G
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G is constructed with edges (Ci, Cj , xij), where xij is the disturbance that transformed
the system from a state si ∈ Ci to a state sj ∈ Cj (line 2). An initially empty graph is
constructed as follows:
• Some starting cells are sampled by sampling states in the initial set S0, finding the
corresponding cell, and adding the cell to a queue Q (line 13).
• On each iteration, a cell C is popped off the queue and K states are sample uniformly
at random from within it (line 16). Then, a disturbance is randomly sampled for each
state (line 17).
• Each sampled state is simulated forward one timestep based on the random disturbance
x (line 19), resulting in a new state in cell Cnew (line 20).
• To ensure the search focuses on promising regions of the state space, the edge (C,
Cnew, x) is only added to the graph if Cnew is in the set of candidate trajectories T
(line 21). On the first iteration, when the set of candidate trajectories is empty, all
edges are added.
Once the graph is constructed, it is searched for candidate trajectories that connect cells
in the initial set to cells in the failure set (line 5). If no candidate trajectories are found
then the algorithm failed. Each candidate trajectory in T is simulated from its starting
state using the disturbance applied at each segment to get an actual trajectory (line 8). The
actual trajectory will not match that candidate trajectory, since the candidate trajectory is
made up of disjoint segments. If the actual trajectory is a counterexample, then we return
it. Otherwise, we reduce the grid size by a factor of γ (line 10) and repeat the procedure.
4.3 Las Vegas Tree Search
Las Vegas tree search (LVTS) [27] is a tree-based falsification algorithm based on two ideas:
1. The disturbance trajectory x should only be discretized in time as finely as it needs
to be.
2. The system is more likely to be falsified by extreme values of the disturbance space
than less extreme values.
To achieve the first goal, the disturbance trajectory is constructed piecewise from distur-
bances of different durations. Longer duration disturbances can be implemented as a repeti-
tion of a disturbance. Let the notation x[ℓ] indicate that x is applied ℓ times. In LVTS, the
set of possible disturbances at each step is discretized and represented by the set Y and the
probability of selecting disturbances x[ℓ] is P (x[ℓ]). To achieve the second goal, P is defined
to favor distrubances with more extreme. LVTS (algorithm 7) takes as input Y , P , cost
function c, and safety threshold ǫ.
The algorithm proceeds by growing a tree of disturbance trajectories x. Each unfinished
disturbance trajectory x has associated with it a set of explored disturbances (initialized to
the empty set in line 2) and a set of unexplored disturbances (initialized to the set of all
possible segments Y in line 3). For each iteration of the algorithm, a trajectory is stochas-
tically expanded by sampling a new disturbance from P (line 7) and then concatenating
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Algorithm 7 Las Vegas Tree Search
1: function LVTS(Y , P , c, ǫ)
2: explored(x) ← ∅ for all x
3: unexplored(x) ← Y for all x
4: loop
5: x← ∅
6: while unexplored(x) 6= ∅ or explored(x) 6= ∅
7: Sample x from P (x)
8: xnew ← [x x]
9: if x ∈ unexplored(x)
10: unexplored(x)← unexplored(x) \ {x}
11: c, c ← CostBounds(f(xnew))
12: if c < ǫ
13: return xnew
14: if c > ǫ
15: break 4
16: explored(x)← explored(x) ∪ {x}
17: x← xnew
it to the current trajectory (line 8). If the new disturbance has not been explored before,
it is removed from the unexplored set (line 10) and a lower and upper bound on the cost
is computed from the function CostBounds. If the cost function is the robustness, then
the bounds can be computed by the method of Dreossi et al. [26]. If the upper bound is
lower then the safety threshold then a counterexample is found and returned (line 13). If
the lower bound is greater than the safety threshold, then a counterexample is not possible
for this disturbance trajectory and the algorithm restarts (line 15).
Disturbance segments are grouped by a integer ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , ℓmax} that controls the dura-
tion of the segment. For duration ℓ, the set Yℓ is given by
Yℓ = {x
[ℓ] | xi = xi,min + αi,j(xi,max − xi,min)}, (33)
where xi is the ith component of the disturbance space and xi,min and xi,max are the minimum
and maximum values of that component. The factor
αi,j = (2j + 1)/2
bi (34)
for any integer j < (2ℓmax−ℓ − 1)/2 and b1 + . . . + bn = 1. The construction of these
sets ensures that segments with larger values of ℓ have longer duration and more extreme
disturbance values. The full set of segments Y is the union of all the Yℓ up to a maximum
level of refinement ℓmax:
Y =
ℓmax⋃
ℓ=1
Yℓ. (35)
The segment sampling distribution P ensures that disturbances with larger values of ℓ
and lower costs are chosen more often. The distribution is constructed implicitly by assigning
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a weight to each level of refinement
wℓ =
|unexplored(x) ∩ Yℓ|+ |explored(x) ∩ Yℓ|
2ℓmax−ℓ|Yℓ|
(36)
and choosing ℓ with probability wℓ/
∑ℓmax
k=1 wk. The weight is constructed to favor lower
values of ℓ (due to the exponential factor in the denominator) until the number of unexplored
edges goes to zero without finding many plausible trajectories (note that the explored set
only increases if the trajectory remains plausible for falsification). Once the refinement level
is selected, one of the the following four options is selected uniformly at random:
1. Sample x from unexplored(x) ∪ Yl.
2. Sample x from explored(x) ∪ Yl.
3. Choose the x from explored(x) ∪ Yl that minimizes the cost of [x x].
4. Choose the x from explored(x) ∪ Yl that minimizes the cost of [x x x
′] for all x′ ∈
explored([x x]).
Option 1 ensures exploration over the unexplored set, while options 2–4 increasingly exploit
knowledge of trajectories with low costs.
5. Reinforcement Learning
One of the drawbacks to casting falsification as an optimization problem is the need to search
over the entire space of disturbance trajectories, which scales exponentially with the number
of simulation timesteps. This scalability problem may be alleviated if the environment and
the system are modeled as a Markov decision process (MDP) [6]. In an MDP, the next state
only depends on the previous state and the choice of disturbance. We can therefore find
a policy (a function that maps states to disturbances) that can generate counterexamples
when simulated. The policy generates a disturbance based on the state so we do not need to
explicitly represent the entire disturbance trajectory, allowing for the solution of long time
horizon falsification problems [22]. For an overview of MDPs and their solvers see the texts
by Kochenderfer [6] or Sutton and Barto [68].
An MDP is defined by a transition model P (s′ | s, x) that gives the probability of arriving
in state s′ given the current state s, a disturbance (or action) x, a reward R(s, x), and a
discount factor γ that decreases the value of future rewards. In keeping with the notation of
MDP literature, the reward serves the same purpose as the cost function, but is maximized
rather than minimized, and can therefore be thought of as a measure of risk rather than
safety. The goal of an MDP solver is to determine a mapping from states to disturbances
x = π(s), called a policy, that maximizes the expected discounted sum of rewards
E
[∑
t
γtR(st, xt)
]
. (37)
There are several concepts from the MDP literature that are useful for understanding
the algorithms in this section. The first is the notion of the value function V π(s), which is
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the expected discounted sum of future rewards when in the state s and following the policy
π. The value function can be computed as the solution to the Bellman equation
V π(s) = E
[
R (s, π(s)) + γV π(s′)
]
. (38)
The optimal policy π∗ is defined as
π∗(s) = argmax
π
V π(s). (39)
The state-action value function for a policy is Qπ(s, x) which is the value of being in state
s, applying disturbance x, and then following the policy π. It is defined by the Bellman
equation
Qπ(s, x) = E
[
R(s, x) + γQπ
(
s′, π(s′)
)]
. (40)
If the size of the state space and disturbance space is discrete then Qπ can be computed
exactly with matrix inversion or dynamic programming [6]. If the state or action space is
large or continuous (as is often the case for cyber-physical systems), Qπ can be estimated
through random sampling and bootstrapping [68].
A major challenge in formulating an MDP is designing the reward function. Akazaki et
al. [69] uses a reward that is a convex function of the temporal logic robustness
R(x) = exp (−ρ(x)) − 1, (41)
which bounds the negative reward to −1. An approach known as adaptive stress testing
(AST) [70], [71] defines an MDP reward that leads to the discovery of the most-likely coun-
terexample. If the specification ψ is for the system to avoid reaching a set of failure states
Sfail, then the reward is defined as:
R(st, xt) =


0 if st ∈ Sfail
−λ if st 6∈ Sfail, t ≥ tmax
log p(xt | st) if st 6∈ Sfail, t < tmax.
(42)
A large positive number λ is chosen to penalize disturbances that do not end in a failure
state. The log probability of the disturbance is rewarded at each time step to encourage the
discovery of likely failures.
Often, the reward requires some amount of domain knowlege. For example, Qin et al. [72]
penalize disturbances that do not follow a domain-specific set of constraints, which is useful
for getting adversarial agents in a driving scenario to follow traffic laws. Other examples of
domain-specific heuristics are described in section 8.
We consider two types of reinforcement learning algorithms. First, we discuss Monte
Carlo tree search algorithms which use online planning to maximize reward. Then, we
present deep reinforcement learning algorithms which use offline learning and neural net-
works to estimate the optimal policy or value function.
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5.1 Monte Carlo Tree Search
Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS) is an online planning algorithm for sequential decision
making that has seen success in the games of go [73], chess [74], shogi [74], and falsifica-
tion [70], [75]–[78]. Monte Carlo tree search uses online planning to determine the best
actions to take from a starting state to maximize reward. A search tree is maintained over
all of the paths tried as well as an estimate of the value function at each step. Each iteration
in MCTS consists of four steps:
1. Selection: Starting from the root of the search tree, disturbances are selected sequen-
tially until reaching a leaf node, with the goal of choosing disturbances that are more
likely to lead to high reward. The most common selection heuristic is based on upper
confidence bounds (UCB) [79], which provides a principled trade-off between explo-
ration and exploitation. The selected disturbance is the one with the highest UCB
given by
Q(st, xt) + c
√
logN(st)
N(st, xt)
,
where Q(st, xt) is the estimated state-action value at st, N(st) is the number of visits
to state st, N(st, xt) is the number of times xt has been selected from st, and c is a
hyperparameter that controls exploration.
2. Expansion: Once the algorithm arrives at a leaf node, a new disturbance is chosen,
and a node is added to the tree with zero visits.
3. Rollout : The value of the new node is estimated by running a simulation from the
new node while choosing disturbances according to a rollout policy until the episode
terminates or the finite planning horizon is reached. The rollout estimate is denoted
q.
4. Backpropagation: The value of the new node is used to update the value of all of its
ancestors in the tree according to
Q(st, xt)← Q(st, xt) +
q −Q(st, xt)
N(st, xt)
. (43)
The visit counts are also updated N(st, xt)← N(st, xt) + 1.
These four steps are repeated until a stopping criterion is met such as computational
budget, wall-clock time limit, or a threshold for the reward of the best solution found so
far. At that point, the best trace can be returned, or, for longer time-horizon problems,
the best candidate disturbance is selected and the process restarts, possibly retaining the
subtree associated with the selected disturbance.
In problems where there is a discrete state or observation space, it makes sense to main-
tain separate state and disturbance nodes so if a state is repeated, the corresponding node in
the tree can be reused, increasing the ability of the algorithm to reuse prior information. In
most safety validation problems, however, the state space of the simulator will be continuous
(or unavailable to the algorithm entirely), in which case the same state will rarely be sam-
pled twice. To save memory, it is common to only include disturbance nodes in the search
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tree, which is equivalent to setting the state equal to the concatenation of all disturbances
that led to it (st = x1:t).
The discrete nature of nodes in the search tree are incompatible with a continuous
disturbance space X. Delmas et al. [77] discretizes the disturbance space into a small
number of discrete disturbances that are representative of the continuous space. As an
alternative to discretization, when adding a new node to the tree, Lee et al. [70] samples a
new disturbance xt from a known distribution over disturbances by selecting a random seed
uniformly at random and using it to produce disturbances from p(x).
The UCB ensures that all disturbances are tried at least once from each node. When
the disturbance space is large, however, this requirement restricts the depth of tree. An
extension used to mitigate this problem is known as progressive widening [80], [81], where a
new disturbance node is added as a child of node st when
|C(st)| ≤ kN(st)
α, (44)
where C(st) is the number of children, and k and α are hyperparameters.
Zhang et al. [75] combined MCTS with global optimization, using MCTS for exploration
of the disturbance trajectory space and global optimization for refinement of the disturbance
trajectories. The disturbance space is first discretized into L1× . . .×Ln equal-sized regions.
Each node in the tree represents one of the regions in the disturbance space denoted Bt.
When a new node is added to the tree at depth d, its value is estimated by solving the
following constrained optimization problem:
max
x
E
[∑
t
γtR(st, xt)
]
s.t. x1 ∈ B1, . . . , xd ∈ Bd.
(45)
This approach can be combined with progressive widening when the disturbance space is
large. Instead of randomly sampling a new region, optimization can be used to find the
optimal region to expand. When adding a new disturbance at depth d + 1, solve eq. (45)
with the added constraint that xd+1 exists in the set of regions that have yet to be expanded.
For ease of optimization, that subset may be further restricted to its convex subset [75]. Once
the MCTS budget is spent, traces with high reward can be found by solving the constrained
optimization problem of the highest performing branch of the tree.
The use of optimization for each new node of the search tree increases the computational
cost of the algorithm. Zhang et al. [75] note that balancing the computational budget
between optimization iterations and tree expansions is critical to the success of this approach.
They compare simulated annealing (SA) [39], Globalized Nelder-Mead (GNM) [35], and
covariance matrix adaptation evolution strategy (CMA-ES) [34] for the global optimization
algorithms. It is noted that since CMA-ES has a built-in exploration strategy, it sees less
improvement when combined for MCTS than SA and GNM. GNM, on the other hand,
does not have an exploration strategy (beyond probabilistic restarts) and therefore sees a
significant improvement with MCTS.
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5.2 Deep Reinforcement Learning
Deep reinforcement learning (DRL) is a category of reinforcement learning that uses deep
neural networks to represent the value function V (s), the state-action value function Q(s, x),
or the policy π(s). DRL has shown state-of-the art results in playing Atari games [82],
playing chess [74], and robot manipulation from camera input [83]. In recent years, different
DRL techniques have been applied to falsification and most-likely failure analysis [22], [69],
[72], [84]–[88].
DRL algorithms are broadly split between value-function approaches, where the neural
network is used to represent the value function, and policy search approaches, where the
neural network represents the policy. There are advantages and disadvantages to both, and
several algorithms are discussed below. The reader is referred to the original papers for
implementation details.
If the disturbance spaceX is discrete, then the deep Q-network (DQN) [82] algorithm can
be used for falsification [69], [72]. In DQN, the optimal Q function is estimated by a neural
network that takes as input the state s and outputs a value for each discrete disturbance.
Disturbances are selected greedily as
x = argmax
x
Q(s, x) (46)
with probability 1 − δ and chosen at random with probability δ to encourage exploration.
The parameters of the Q network are updated to minimize the mean squared error between
the current value and a target
Qtarget(s, x) = r(s, x) + γmax
x′
Q(s′, x′). (47)
Since the target value greedily selects the highest value disturbance, the Q-network can be
trained on any sample of a state, disturbance, and reward (a feature known as off-policy
learning). Many implementations of DQN therefore maintain a replay buffer that stores
previous (s, x, r) tuples which are repeatedly used to update the network parameters. This
reuse of data makes DQN a relatively sample-efficient algorithm. The main drawback of
DQN is that it is incompatible with large or continuous disturbance spaces.
For large or continuous disturbance spaces, the policy itself is represented by a neural
network (with parameters θ) that takes the state as input and either outputs a disturbance
directly (e.g. x = πθ(s)) or outputs parameters of a distribution from which a disturbance
can be sampled (e.g. for a normal distribution [µ, σ2] = πθ(s) and x ∼ N (µ, σ
2)). The
policy is optimized to produce higher rewards using the policy gradient method [89]. Policy
gradient methods can suffer from high variance and can be unstable during optimization.
To improve optimization stability, an approach known as trust region policy optimization
(TRPO) [90] restricts the amount a policy can change at each step. TRPO has previously
been used for falsification of autonomous vehicles [22], [84], [85].
Another drawback of policy gradient methods is their inability to learn off-policy. With-
out data reuse, these methods can require a large number of simulations to converge. Newer
approaches combine policy gradient methods with value function methods to create the
actor-critic paradigm, which can perform well on problems with continuous disturbance
spaces while also using previous simulation data to improve sample efficiency. Actor-critic
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methods [91] use two neural networks, one for the policy (the actor network) and one for
the value function (the critic network) and come in several varieties. Advantage actor critic
(A2C) was used for falsification by Kuutti, Fallah, and Bowden [87]. Its more scalable
counterpart, asynchronous advantage actor critic (A3C), was used by Akazaki et al. [69].
Behzadan and Munir [86] use another actor-critic method known as deep deterministic policy
gradient (DDPG) combined with Ornstein-Uhlenbeck exploration [92].
One potential drawback of using DRL for black-box falsification is the requirement for
a simulator that can be observed after each disturbance is applied. Koren and Kochender-
fer [85] developed a DRL technique (also used by Corso et al. [84]) that does not require
access to the simulator state. The technique uses a recurrent neural network (RNN) with
long-short term memory (LSTM) layers as the policy [93]. The RNN maintains a hidden
state akin to the state of the simulator that is used to make future decisions. The input to
each layer is the previous disturbance and the initial state of the simulation, allowing the
approach to generalize across initial conditions.
DRL can be combined with tree search in an approach called go-explore (GE) [94], which
has been effective for hard-exploration problems with long time horizons. The first stage of
GE is a random tree search over the disturbance space with heuristics that are designed to
encourage efficient exploration. The heuristics bias the search towards unseen states, and
away from states that have not resulted in productive rollouts. The second stage uses the
backwards algorithm (BA) [95] to learn a policy that mimics the best disturbance trajectory
found from the tree search. In expectation, rollouts from this policy obtain the same or
better reward as the original trajectory.
While the original version of GE uses the state of the simulator when building the tree
and training the robust policy, Koren and Kochenderfer [88] modified the algorithm to use
the history of disturbances instead, reducing the access requirements of the simulator. GE
was used for the falsification of an autonomous vehicle and was able to find counterexamples
more reliably than MCTS on problems with long horizons and BA was able to find more
probable failures than MCTS, or DRL. Furthermore, GE was able to find failures when no
guiding reward heuristic was used, reducing the expert domain knowledge needed to perform
falsification.
6. Importance Sampling Algorithms
For many cyber-physical applications, it is impossible to design an autonomous system that
never violates a specification. In that case, we may wish to know how likely it is for a
system to fail. To estimate the probability of failure, we can sample disturbance trajectories
from the distribution with density p(x) and compute the empirical probability of failure. A
hypothesis test can be used to check if the probability failure is less than a desired threshold.
Hypothesis testing for cyber-physical systems is the domain of statistical model checking [96],
[97] and is not covered in this survey.
If the probability of failure is very small, i.e. a failure event is rare, then the Monte Carlo
approach will require a large number of samples before converging to the true probability of
failure [98]. To address this problem, we would like to artificially make failures more likely,
and then weight them accordingly, to get an unbiased estimate of the probability of failure
with fewer samples. This is the idea behind importance sampling.
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Suppose we wish to estimate the probability that a system violates a specification. A
failure occurs when the safety evaluation metric c(x) is less than a safety threshold ǫ, rep-
resented here as the indicator function 1{c(x) < ǫ}. As in section 3, c(x) is defined such
that c(x) < ǫ implies f(x) 6∈ ψ. The probability of failure Pfail is the expectation over the
probability density px, i.e.
Pfail = Ep [1{c(x) < ǫ}] . (48)
In importance sampling, we choose a proposal distribution q(x) that makes failures more
likely but has the property that q(x) > 0 everywhere p(x) > 0 (so all disturbances are still
possible). The proposal distribution is sometimes referred to as the biased, sampled, or
importance distribution. The importance sampling estimate of the probability of failure is
done by taking N samples drawn from q and computing the weighted average
Pˆfail =
1
N
N∑
i=1
p(xi)
q(xi)
1{c(xi) < ǫ}. (49)
The variance of the importance sampling estimate is given by
Var(Pˆfail) =
1
N
Eq
[
(p(x)1{c(xi) < ǫ} − q(x)Pfail)
2
q(x)
]
. (50)
The goal of a good importance sampling distribution is to minimize the variance of the
estimator Pˆfail so that fewer samples are needed for a good estimate. From eq. (50), we can
see that a zero variance estimate can be obtained if we use the optimal importance sampling
distribution
q∗(x) =
p(x)1{c(x) < ǫ}
Pfail
. (51)
Generating this distribution is not possible in practice because c(x) is a black box and the
normalization constant Pfail is the very quantity we would like to estimate. The algorithms
in this section seek to estimate the optimal importance sampling distribution q∗(x).
The choice of a proposal distribution can significantly affect the performance of impor-
tance sampling algorithms and a bad choice can lead to estimates with larger variance than
the basic Monte Carlo approach. For example, if q(x) is very small, where p(x) is relatively
large, then the weight p(x)/q(x) ≫ 1 and some samples will dominate the probability esti-
mate (eq. (49)). To identify if a bad proposal distribution is chosen consider the size of the
weights or compute the effective sample size. When samples with large weights are being
drawn, Kim and Kochenderfer [99] suggest limiting the maximum weight by clipping the
proposal distribution in regions with large weights.
6.1 Cross-Entropy Method
The cross-entropy method [100], [101] iteratively learns the optimal importance sampling
distribution from a family of distributions q(x; θ) parameterized by θ. The optimal dis-
tribution parameters θ∗ are found by minimizing the KL-divergence between a proposal
distribution q(x; θ) and the optimal distribution q∗(x), i.e.
θ∗ = argmin
θ
DKL(q
∗(x) ‖ q(x; θ)), (52)
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where DKL calculates the KL-divergence. Substituting the definitions, we can arrive at a
stochastic optimization program
θ∗ = argmin
θ
−
∫
x
q∗(x) log q(x; θ)dx
= argmax
θ
∫
x
1{c(x) < ǫ}p(x)
Pfail
log q(x; θ)dx
= argmax
θ
Eϕ
[
1{c(x) < ǫ}
p(x)
q(x;ϕ)
log q(x; θ)
]
≈ argmax
θ
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
1{c(xi) < ǫ}
p(xi)
q(xi;ϕ)
log q(xi; θ)
]
,
(53)
where ϕ is any set of parameters and xi are sampled from q(x;ϕ). eq. (53) can be solved
analytically when the family of algorithms is in the natural exponential family (i.e. normal,
exponential, Poisson, gamma, binomial, and others), and the solution corresponds to the
maximum likelihood estimate of the parameters [101].
For an iterative solution to finding θ∗, we start by choosing a set of starting parameters
θ0 so that q(x; θ0) is close to p(x). Then, we iterate k = 0, 1, . . .
1. Set ϕ = θk.
2. Draw samples {x1, . . . ,xN} from q(x;ϕ).
3. Solve eq. (53) for θk+1.
One major challenge to this approach is the rarity of failure events. If all samples have
c(x) > ǫ, then Pˆfail = 0 and the algorithm may not converge to the optimal proposal
distribution. One solution is to adaptively update the safety threshold ǫ at each iteration.
At iteration k, a safety threshold ǫk and a rarity parameter ρ is chosen so that the fraction
of samples that have c(x) < ǫk is ρ. The parameter ρ is also known as the quantile level
and is often set in the range ρ = [0.01, 0.2] [99], [102]. The entire algorithm is shown in
algorithm 8. Note that we assume ρN is an integer used for indexing on line 7.
The cross-entropy method has been used to estimate the probability of failure for aircraft
collision avoidance systems [99] and autonomous vehicles [102]–[104]. Typically, probability
distributions in the natural exponential family are used [99], [102], [103] so that cross-entropy
updates can be performed analytically. Huang et al. [104] propose a method for using piece-
wise exponential distributions for more flexibility while retaining the ability to compute
updates analytically. Sankaranarayanan and Fainekos [105] discuss piecewise uniform dis-
tributions over the disturbance space, and techniques for factoring the space to reduce the
number of parameters needed.
6.2 Multilevel Splitting
Multilevel splitting [106] is a non-parametric approach to estimating the optimal impor-
tance sampling distribution. Rather than relying on an explicit probability distribution
(as in the cross-entropy method), multilevel splitting relies on Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) estimation and scales better to larger dimensions [107]. It has been applied to the
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Algorithm 8 Cross-Entropy Method
1: function CrossEntropy(p, q, θ0, ρ, c, ǫ)
2: θ ← θ0
3: k ← 0
4: loop
5: Sample {x1, . . . ,xN} from q(x; θk)
6: Sort {x1, . . . ,xN} by c(xi)
7: ǫk ← max(c(xρN ), ǫ)
8: θk+1 ← argmax
θ
1
N
∑N
i=1
[
1{c(xi) < ǫ}
p(xi)
q(xi;θk)
log q(xi; θ)
]
9: if ǫk < ǫ
10: break
11: k ← k + 1
12: return EstimateProbability(p, qθk)
estimation of probability of failure of autonomous driving policies with a large number of
parameters [108].
The idea of multilevel splitting is to define a set of threshold levels ∞ = ǫ0 > ǫ1 > . . . >
ǫK = ǫ and assume that the probability of failure can be computed as a Markov chain of
the form
P (c(x) < ǫ) =
K∏
k=1
P (c(x) < ǫk | c(x) < ǫk−1). (54)
Given enough levels (i.e. a large enough K), each conditional probability
Pk = P (c(x) < ǫk | c(x) < ǫk−1) (55)
is much larger than P (c(x) < ǫ) and can therefore be computed efficiently with basic Monte
Carlo methods. Algorithm 9 outlines the algorithm. At iteration k, N samples of x are
sorted by their cost function (line 8) and used to estimate the conditional probability Pk
(line 10). The total probability is updated based on the Markov assumption (line 11). All
samples with c(x) > ǫk are discarded, and the remaining samples are resampled to get back
up to N samples (line 12). Those samples perform a random walk of M steps using a kernel
T (x′ | x) (line 13). The process repeats until the level reaches the true safety threshold.
The choice of levels ǫk can be done adaptively [109] by selecting a rarity parameter ρ such
that we keep ρN samples per iteration (line 9).
6.3 Classification Methods
Supervised learning can be used to classify disturbances as safe or unsafe. That classification
can then be combined with importance sampling to estimate the probability of failure of the
system. Supervised learning often requires observing more than one example of a failure,
so these approaches are most applicable when failures can be found relatively easily. One
approach is to use a space-filling sampling plan for the disturbance [110] to ensure good cov-
erage of the disturbance space, but this fails to scale to high dimensions. Another approach
is to use previous versions of the system that are far less safe [111]. Known as a continuation
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Algorithm 9 Adaptive Multilevel Splitting Method
1: function MulitlevelSplitting(p, N , M , T , c, ǫ)
2: Pfail ← 1
3: k ← 1
4: ǫ0 =∞
5: Sample {x1, . . . ,xN} from p(x)
6: while ǫk > ǫ
7: k ← k + 1
8: Sort {x1, . . . ,xN} by c(xi)
9: ǫk ← max(c(xρN ), ǫ)
10: Pk ←
1
N
∑N
i=1 1{c(xi) < ǫk}
11: Pfail ← PfailPk
12: Resample {x1, . . . ,xN} from {x1, . . . ,xρN}
13: Random walk M steps using T (x′ | x) for each {x1, . . . ,xN}
14: return Pfail
approach, this technique is well suited to black-boxes that have learned behavior. During
the learning process, the system will fail more easily (but in related ways) to the version
that is ultimately being tested. Therefore, earlier versions of the system can be used for
classification of disturbances.
One way to combine supervised learning with importance sampling was explored by
Huang et al. [110]. They built a proposal distribution centered on the boundary between
safe and unsafe disturbances. If q(x; θ) is a proposal distribution with parameters θ, then
they search for the point x∗ in the set of failures that maximizes the probability of the
proposal distribution:
x
∗ = argmax
x
1{c(x) < ǫ}q(x; θ). (56)
Then, they adjust the parameters of the proposal distribution such that the mean is located
at x∗. This approach has shown to construct an efficient proposal distribution when the
unsafe set is convex [112]. In practice, it is unlikely that the set is convex, but we can find a
linear boundary between safe and unsafe examples using the support vector machine (SVM)
algorithm [113] if the disturbance space is lifted to a higher dimension through a mapping
φ(x).
Once a boundary is found, the choice of distribution q determines the feasibility of
computing x∗. One approach is to represent q by a mixture of K Gaussians with weights α
as
qGMM(x;µi, σi) =
K∑
i=1
αiN (x;µi, σi). (57)
The optimal mean for each Gaussian model x∗i is determined separately and the proposal
distribution is reconstructed by
q∗GMM(x;x
∗
i , σi) =
K∑
i=1
αiN (x;x
∗
i , σi). (58)
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Note that a Gaussian mixture model (GMM) can be obtained in the lifted space q˜GMM(φ(x))
and then reduced to the true disturbance space by integrating over the extra dimensions.
The approach is outlined in algorithm 10.
Algorithm 10 Classification-based Importance Sampling
1: function ClassificationImportanceSampling(p, M , φ, c, ǫ)
2: Sample {x1, . . . ,xM} from p(x) and fit a GMM q˜GMM(φ(x);µi, σi)
3: Sample {x1, . . . ,xN} and compute {1{c(x1) < ǫ}, . . . ,1{c(xN ) < ǫ}}
4: Lift the disturbances by computing {φ(x1), . . . , φ(xN )}
5: Apply SVM on pairs {(φ(x1),1{c(x1) < ǫ}), . . . , (φ(xN ),1{c(xN ) < ǫ})}
6: Determine the optimal points φ∗i
7: Construct q˜∗GMM(φ(x);φ
∗
i , σi)
8: Marginalize to q∗(x)
9: return EstimateProbability(p, q∗)
An alternative approach by Uesato et al. [111] uses supervised learning to estimate the
probability of failure Pˆfail(x) for a disturbance x. The function Pˆfail(x) can be represented
using a neural network or some other model and is trained on failure examples. The optimal
importance sampling distribution was proven to be
q∗(x) =
√
Pˆfail(x)p(x)
Ep
[√
Pˆfail(x)
] , (59)
which can be sampled from using rejection sampling.
6.4 Approximate Dynamic Programming
While most importance sampling approaches focus on the entire space of disturbance trajec-
tories, the approach of Corso, Lee, and Kochenderfer [114] uses the framework of sequential
decision making to find the optimal importance sampling policy q(x | s) for a simulation
state s. It is shown in that work that for a Markovian system and simulator, the optimal
importance sampling policy is given by
q(x | s) =
p(x | s)Pfail(s
′)
Pfail(s)
, (60)
where s′ is deterministically reached after disturbance x is applied in state s. The probability
of failure Pfail(s) can be estimated through the approximate solution of the Bellman equation
Pfail(s) =


1 if s ∈ Sfail
0 if s /∈ Sfail, s ∈ Sterm∑
a p(x | s)Pfail(s
′) otherwise
, (61)
where Sterm is the set of terminal states that are not failure states. Local approximation dy-
namic programming and Monte Carlo estimations are two successful approaches for solving
eq. (61) [114].
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7. Problem Decomposition Techniques
One of the most significant challenges to overcome for the safety validation of autonomous
systems is that algorithms often scale poorly to large disturbance spaces and state spaces.
This section will address two approaches for decomposing the falsification problem into more
manageable subproblems to accelerate finding counterexamples.
7.1 State Space Decomposition
The approach presented by Corso, Lee, and Kochenderfer [114] involves decomposing the
simulator state and disturbance spaces into independent components, and finding failures
for each component. Originally done in the context of multiple distinct actors in a simulated
driving environment, this approach can be used with any simulation that has components
that can be simulated individually. To separate the state space intoM different components,
define a decomposition operator D such that
{s(1), . . . , s(M)} = D(s) (62)
and the disturbance space X(i) associated with the state s(i) is smaller than the full dis-
turbance space (i.e. |X(i)| < |X|). For each subproblem, solve for a policy that finds
counterexamples
x(i) = π(i)(s(i)) (63)
and then combine the policies with a fusion function F such that
x = F (π(1), . . . , π(M))(s). (64)
An approach for solving the subproblems that is amenable to policy fusion is approximate
dynamic programming (see section 6.4). In that case, the subproblem policy is defined by
computing the probability of failure for each state component P
(i)
fail. The fusion function can
then apply simple arithmetic operations (like mean, max, or min) to arrive at a joint policy
P˜fail(s) = F
(
P
(1)
fail(s
(1)), . . . , P
(1)
fail(s
(m))
)
(65)
x =
p(x | s)Pfail(s
′)
Pfail(s)
, (66)
where s′ is the deterministic state reached after applying disturbance x at state s.
If the fusion function is simple, then it may not capture the joint interactions between
multiple disturbance components [114]. To address this problem, a global correction factor
can be learned from the full simulation. We have
Pfail(s) ≈ P˜fail(s) + δPθ(s). (67)
The correction factor δPθ is trained using rollouts {s1, . . . , sN} from the full simulation
and minimizing the difference between the estimate P˜θ(si) and the actual discounted return
G(si) where
G(si) = 1{sN ∈ Sfail}
∏N
t=i p(xt | st−1)
π(xt | st−1)
. (68)
This approach has been shown to increase the number of failures found in a complex driving
environment with a large disturbance space [114].
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7.2 Compositional Approach with Machine Learning Components
The approach of Dreossi, Donzé, and Seshia [115] is applicable when the system contains a
machine-learned component that performs classification (such as a neural network based
perception system). Knowing something about the structure of the system makes this
approach gray-box, but due to the prevalence of ML components, it is still widely applicable.
The algorithm is performed with the following steps:
• The ML component of interest is partitioned from the rest of the system and environ-
ment f(x). The ML component, which has a large disturbance space, is replaced with
an idealized abstraction with a much smaller input space.
• The simulator with the idealized ML component is separated into two versions: 1)
f+(x) where the ML component behaves as well as possible (i.e. classifying all inputs
correctly), and 2) f−(x) where the ML component behaves poorly.
• For each version of the simulator, a traditional falsification algorithm is used to par-
tition the disturbance space into the regions that satisfy the specification safe(x and
regions of failures fail(x). The notation safe(x)± indicates the safe disturbance set for
f±(x). Similar notation is used for the failure set.
• To find counterexamples that were caused by the ML component, find falsifying exam-
ples in the set safe(x)+ \ safe(x)−. The set safe(x)− is removed because no failure is
possible in this region even with the ML component functioning as poorly as possible.
This part of the disturbance space is referred to as the region of interest.
• Finally, use a separate analyzer (possibly white-box) to identify the high-dimensional
inputs that lead to failures (i.e. misclassifications) in the region of interest.
This approach has been able to find counterexamples in a neural network perception system
used by an autonomous vehicle [115]. A similar approach by Julian, Lee, and Kochender-
fer [78] uses a white-box neural network analyzer combined with Monte Carlo tree search to
find failure trajectories of an image-based control system.
8. Applications
Autonomous cars and aircraft are two major application domains of black-box safety vali-
dation methods. While there are a variety of scenarios within these application domains, a
common underlying principle is that of miss distance as a reward heuristic. For most scenar-
ios, it is possible to use some sort of distance metric to measure how close the system came
to a failure during the scenario. This distance is then used to allow optimization to find
counterexamples. The autonomous vehicles and aircraft application domains are covered in
more detail below.
8.1 Autonomous Driving
Within the field of autonomous driving, there are multiple scenarios that are commonly used
for testing:
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Lane-Following. Lane-following is one of the most common examples in the autonomous
vehicle field, and has been used to test systems ranging from full-stack systems [102] to
systems with ideal perception [86] to systems that are not fully autonomous like advanced
driver-assistance systems (ADAS) [61]. The system under test tries to maintain a desired
speed in the current lane and may [60] or may not [87] have the ability to change lanes.
The goal is often to find collisions, most commonly rear-end collisions. Scenario variations
include both highway driving [108] and local road driving [116].
Intersection Scenarios. In an intersection scenario, the system under test approaches a
stoplight [116], stop sign [45], crosswalk [22], or other form of intersection and must proceed
through without a failure. Failures can include collisions with pedestrians [88] or other
vehicles [116]. Failures may also include violations of traffic laws, although we found no
previous work in this area.
Lane Change Scenarios. Lane change scenarios can involve the test vehicle initiating a
lane change or reacting to one [72], [103]. Existing work has considered ADAS and other
driver aid systems [110]. Failure modes include rear-end collisions as well as side collisions
caused by turning into an occupied lane.
Platooning Vehicles. Hu, Lygeros, and Sastry [117] present a platooning scenario, where
a number of cars are following a lead car while keeping a specific trailing distance. The
vehicles are subjected to various stochastic disturbances arising from road conditions, wind
conditions, or the presence of human operators. The goal of the system is to minimize the
time that platoon vehicles spend in “chasing” mode, where they attempt to catch up to the
vehicle ahead. The system fails when any of the vehicles gets too far from or too close to
the leading vehicle.
Within these applications, researchers have developed domain specific techniques to im-
prove performance. The most common approach is to use miss distance, the physical distance
between the test vehicle and other vehicles in the simulation, as a reward heuristic to allow
easier optimization [88]. Miss distance is also the underlying principle for robust semantics
of temporal formulas when applied to autonomous vehicles [75]. Some work has been done
on identifying situations where a collision is imminent instead of the collision itself, some-
times called “unsafe states” [61] or “boundary cases” [60] since these regions may be easier
to find.
8.2 Autonomous Flying and Aircraft Collision Avoidance
Black-box validation techniques have also been applied to aircraft in multiple ways:
Flight Control Software. Delmas et al. [77] present an application where the controller
must keep an aircraft in steady flight in response to disturbances such as wind or pilot inputs.
Failures include reduced flight quality, autopilot disengagements, and overshoots of expert-
defined thresholds. A second application is presented by Ernst et al. [118], where an F-16
controller performs automatic maneuvers to avoid ground collisions. Validation algorithms
search for violations of a minimum altitude from various initial conditions. Julian, Lee,
and Kochenderfer [78] perform safety validation on a neural network controller with camera
inputs for aircraft taxiing.
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Collision Avoidance. There are several examples of applications to collision avoidance
problems for aircraft. Lee et al. [70] validate the next-generation aircraft collision avoidance
system (ACAS X), which makes recommendations to pilots to avoid mid-air collisions. The
system may or may not coordinate its recommendations with the other aircraft. A failure
occurs when the aircraft pass too close to one another, known as a near mid-air collision
(NMAC). Esposito, Kim, and Kumar [54] validate a control system that guides a group
of planes from an initial location to a final destination in the presence of stochastic wind
disturbances. A failure in this case is a collision between any two aircraft.
Flight Path-Planning. Systems are given a mission, which is a series of waypoints that
the system must navigate [119], or a target location and keep-out zones along the path [120].
Falsifying trajectories may be different mission parameters or disturbances during mission
execution, such as wind and sensor noise. Failures occur when the system enters areas
defined as off-limits, collides with an obstacle, or produces a software error.
8.3 General Systems
Hybrid Systems. Algorithms for black-box safety validation have also been applied to a
number of hybrid systems outside of autonomous driving and autonomous aircraft. Hoxha,
Abbas, and Fainekos [121] present an automatic transmission system model, which is widely
used as a benchmark problem in the literature. The system under test selects a gear based
on throttle and brake inputs as well as state information such as current engine load and
car speed. Failure events include violations of speed thresholds and changing gears too
often. Jin et al. [122] present another widely used benchmark problem from the automotive
field. The system is an abstract fuel controller for an automotive powertrain. The controller
receives inputs such as fuel-flow measurements and throttle and must output a fuel command.
Failures may be either steady-state, such as the violation of an air-to-fuel ratio, or transient,
such as pulses that violate a settling-time constraint.
Non-automotive systems have also been considered as well. Kim, Esposito, and Ku-
mar [55] analyze a thermostat model under various environmental conditions and test
whether the heater will be active for longer than a certain proportion of time. Schuler,
Adegas, and Anta [123] present a simplified model of a wind turbine, which attempts to
generate as much power as possible based on the current wind speed. Failures are violations
of safety criteria, which include violations of thresholds on tower base moment and rotor
speed.
Controllers. Systems with neural network controllers have also become common case
studies for validation techniques. Yaghoubi and Fainekos [41] test a steam condenser con-
trolled by a recurrent neural network (RNN). The system modulates steam flow rate based
on energy balance and cooling water mass balance. A failure occurs when the pressure
falls outside the acceptable range. Yaghoubi and Fainekos [41] also present a generalized
non-linear system controlled by a feed-forward neural network. A failure is defined as a
constraint on the reference signal value. Ernst et al. [118] study a neural network controlled
magnet levitation system. The controller takes a reference position as input and attempts to
move the magnet to track the given reference position. A failure occurs if the magnet does
not stabilize to a position close enough to the reference position within some time limit.
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Planning Modules. Falsification of planning modules is common among the autonomous
vehicle and aircraft applications, but there are examples in other domains as well. Kim,
Esposito, and Kumar [55] present a hovercraft navigation application. The validation task
tests whether the hovercraft can successfully navigate to some goal region while subjected
to stochastic wind disturbances. Similarly, Zhang et al. [75] validate a free-floating robot
system that must navigate to a desired target location. Fehnker and Ivančić [124] present a
generalization of this task, where an agent is moving in a discrete 2D environment, sometimes
called a gridworld task. In their formulation, there are states that must be reached and states
that must be avoided. A violation of either constraint is considered a failure.
9. Existing Tools
Implementations of various safety validation algorithms have been made available as tools
for others to use. The existing tools range from open-source academic-based toolboxes
to closed-source commercial software. Each of these tools creates falsifying disturbance
trajectories to a system given a set of system requirements that should be satisfied. Certain
tools also perform most-likely failure analysis and failure probability estimation. Many of
the existing tools interface with the MATLAB programming language/environment to stress
industry standard Simulink models. The tools surveyed in this section focus on black or gray-
box testing of cyber-physical systems and although some of these tools include additional
functionality, this section focuses on features of the safety validation components. A brief
overview of the existing safety validation tools will be discussed and their benefits and
restrictions will be highlighted.
9.1 Academic Tools
Many of the existing safety validation tools are products of academic research and released as
experimental prototypes. Although these tools are prototypes, several have matured enough
to gain wide-spread usage and acceptance [26], [30], [67], [119], [125]. Two particular falsi-
fication tools have become benchmark standards in the field: S-TaLiRo [126] and Breach
[33]. Both are open-sourced MATLAB toolboxes for optimization-based falsification. While
most of the tools are open-sourced, two other tools referenced in the falsification literature
are not publicly available but still discussed. Although their respective papers indicate how
to recreate their work, none of those tools have code or executables available online. The
following collection is organized into optimization-based and reinforcement learning-based
tools.
9.2 Optimization-based Tools
The tools in this section employ a standard optimization-based technique to search for
counterexamples. Section 3 outline the approaches implemented by the following tools.
S-TaLiRo. S-TaLiRo (Systems Temporal Logic Robustness) [32], [126] is a simulation-
based MATLAB toolbox for temporal logic falsification of non-linear hybrid systems. S-
TaLiRo parameterizes the disturbance space to reformulate the falsification problem as
an optimization problem. S-TaLiRo instructs the user to specify system requirements as
metric temporal logic (MTL) formulas and then constructs the optimization cost function
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to minimize a global robustness metric. Various optimization techniques are included in
the S-TaLiRo toolbox, such as simulated annealing (described in section 3.1), genetic algo-
rithms (described in section 3.2), stochastic optimization with adaptive restarts (described in
section 3.3), the cross-entropy method (described in section 6.1), and uniform random sam-
pling. S-TaLiRo is designed to analyze arbitrary MATLAB functions or Simulink/Stateflow
models. S-TaLiRo is open-source and available under the GNU General Public License
(GPL).1
Specific add-ons to S-TaLiRo have been implemented that extend the core falsification
functionalities. These add-ons generally provide other solution methods or provide addi-
tional simulation environments that interface with S-TaLiRo. Two applicable add-ons are
described as follows.
DP-TaLiRo. DP-TaLiRo (Dynamic Programming Temporal Logic Robustness) [25]
is an algorithmic add-on to S-TaLiRo that can be used as the robustness computation
engine. A dynamic programming algorithm is implemented for the robustness metric. DP-
TaLiRo is included as a standard part of S-TaLiRo.
Sim-ATAV. Sim-ATAV (Simulation-based Adversarial Testing for Autonomous Vehi-
cles) [116] is an add-on to S-TaLiRo that provides a simulation framework for autonomous
vehicle testing. Sim-ATAV is an open-source Python framework and is available under the
MIT license.2
Breach. Breach [33], [115] is a simulation-based MATLAB toolbox for falsification of
temporal logic specifications for hybrid dynamical systems, similar to S-TaLiRo. Breach
uses optimization-based techniques including simulated annealing (described in section 3.1),
genetic algorithms (described in section 3.2), globalized Nelder-Mead [35], and CMA-ES [34].
The user-defined system requirements are input using signal temporal logic (STL) formulas.
These requirements, i.e. specifications, are used to construct a cost function to be minimized
based on a robustness metric. Breach is designed to test arbitrary MATLAB functions and
Simulink models and includes a MATLAB graphical user interface (GUI) that gives the user
access to the input parameter sets, temporal logic formulas, and trajectory visualizations.
Breach is open-source and available under the BSD license.3
Rrt-Rex. Rrt-Rex (Rapidly-exploring Random Tree Robustness-guided Explorer) [26]
is a MATLAB falsification tool that focuses on coverage given a computational budget. A
Simulink model and user-defined STL requirements are taken as input. RRT path planning
algorithms are used to search the disturbance space for falsifying cases, guided by a combined
state space coverage metric and a robustness satisfaction metric. Section 4 discusses the
RRT approach in detail. Rrt-Rex is not currently publicly available.
9.3 Reinforcement Learning-based Tools
As a direct replacement to optimization algorithms, reinforcement learning can be used
as the central idea behind searching for falsifying trajectories. The following tools imple-
1. https://sites.google.com/a/asu.edu/s-taliro
2. https://sites.google.com/a/asu.edu/s-taliro/sim-atav
3. https://github.com/decyphir/breach
37
Corso, Moss, Koren, Lee, Kochenderfer
ment reinforcement learning algorithms as solvers for the falsification problem. Sections 5.1
and 5.2 describe the reinforcement learning algorithms implemented in the tools.
FalStar. FalStar [75] is a prototype Scala tool for falsification of cyber-physical sys-
tems that interfaces with MATLAB through a Java API. FalStar uses reinforcement learn-
ing combined with optimization techniques to generate counterexamples. Techniques include
Monte Carlo tree search with stochastic optimization as described in section 5.1 and adaptive
Las Vegas tree search (aLVTS) as described in section 4.3. FalStar requires a Simulink
model as input and uses the above techniques to generate counterexamples to the STL
specifications. FalStar can also interface directly with the Breach toolbox to use the avail-
able solvers implemented in Breach. FalStar is open-source and available under the BSD
license.4
falsify. falsify [69] is a prototype simulation-based falsification tool that uses deep rein-
forcement learning. Common among the academic tools, falsify can interface directly with
MATLAB functions and Simulink models. Implementing a robustness-guided approach, fal-
sify defines the reward as a convex function of the robustness, as described in section 5. This
robustness-guided reward function is used by two deep reinforcement learning algorithms
implemented in falsify: asynchronous advantage actor critic (A3C) and double deep-Q net-
work (double DQN), both described in section 5.2. The falsify tool is not currently publicly
available.
AST Toolbox. The AST Toolbox (Adaptive Stress Testing Toolbox) [22] is a Python
toolbox for safety validation, which includes falsification, most-likely failure analysis, and
failure probability estimation. The AST Toolbox uses reinforcement learning to find the
most likely failures of black-box systems. Two reinforcement learning techniques used as
solvers are included: Monte Carlo tree search (described in section 5.1) and deep reinforce-
ment learning (described in section 5.2). The AST Toolbox is built on top of two popular
reinforcement learning packages, namely, OpenAI Gym [127] and Garage 5. Building off of
these packages gives the user access to widely used reinforcement learning benchmarking
problems.
To test a system, users must provide the definitions for three basic interfacing functions.
These interfacing functions allow the tool to interact with the black-box system or simulator.
The interface defines how to initialize the system, how to step the system forward (returning
indications of found failures or a real-valued measure of distance to a failure), and finally
a means to determine if the system is in a terminal state. While the implementation of
the interface is restricted to Python, the user can call out to existing executables or other
languages from within Python. As an example, Python can interface with MATLAB through
the MATLAB Engine API for Python.6 The AST Toolbox is open-source and available under
the MIT license.7
A related toolbox, called AdaptiveStressTesting.jl [70], follows a similar paradigm as
the AST Toolbox but is implemented in the Julia programming language [128]. Julia can
4. https://github.com/ERATOMMSD/falstar
5. https://github.com/rlworkgroup/garage
6. https://www.mathworks.com/help/matlab/matlab-engine-for-python.html
7. https://github.com/sisl/AdaptiveStressTestingToolbox
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interface directly with many other programming languages,8 and notably, Julia can interface
with MATLAB through the MATLAB.jl package.9 AdaptiveStressTesting.jl is open-source
and available under the Apache License Version 2.0.10
9.4 Commercial Tools
Certain techniques for safety validation of cyber-physical systems have become available
as commercial toolboxes. This section briefly describes these commercially available tools
relating to black-box safety validation.11
Reactis. Reactis [129] is a simulation-based MATLAB tool from Reactive Systems for
falsification of Simulink models. Reactis has three components: Reactis Tester, Reactis
Simulator, and Reactis Validator. The Reactis Tester controls the generation of falsifying
trajectories. It uses a patented technique called guided simulation which uses proprietary al-
gorithms and heuristics to generate trajectories to maximize coverage for falsification. Then,
the Reactis Simulator runs the system under test given the purposed falsifying tajectory.
The last component, the Reactis Validator, uses proprietary techniques to search for viola-
tions of user-defined model specifications. Reactive Systems also has a version of Reactis for
C [130] that has analogous Reactis components for systems developed in the C programming
language. Reactis is commercially available through Reactive Systems, Inc.12
TestWeaver. TestWeaver [131] is a simulation-based falsification tool from Synopsys.
TestWeaver uses proprietary search algorithms to generate falsifying trajectories while max-
imizing coverage. User-defined system requirements and worst-case quality indicators are
used to guide the search. Extensive knowledge of the underlying system may be required to
provide useful worst-case quality indicators, which may limit the application. TestWeaver
can interface with other simulation frameworks to control the disturbance trajectories via li-
braries in Simulink, Modelica, Python, and C. TestWeaver is commercially available through
Synopsys, Inc.13
TrustworthySearch API. TrustworthySearch API [108] is a risk-based falsification and
probability estimation framework from Trustworthy AI. TrustworthySearch API is specifi-
cally designed for black-box autonomous vehicle safety validation. The tool implements a
probabilistic-based approach through adaptive importance sampling techniques described
in section 6. Importance sampling is a stand in for traditional optimization algorithms
used to search the disturbance space for falsification. The use of a proposal distribution
biased towards rare failure events ensures that these low probability events are sampled
more frequently. Adaptive multilevel splitting (AMS), described in section 6.2, is imple-
mented to estimate this biased distribution from data. Along with falsification, the tool
can also perform failure event probability estimation, unlike other commercially available
products and most academic tools. To estimate the failure probability, the probability from
8. https://github.com/JuliaInterop
9. https://github.com/JuliaInterop/MATLAB.jl
10. https://github.com/sisl/AdaptiveStressTesting.jl
11. The authors are not affiliated with any of the companies.
12. https://www.reactive-systems.com/
13. https://www.synopsys.com/verification/virtual-prototyping/virtual-ecu/testweaver.html
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the biased distribution is reweighted according to the likelihood from the original unbiased
distribution. Although specific to autonomous vehicle safety validation, we include Trust-
worthySearch API to highlight recent advancements of black-box safety validation tools.
TrustworthySearch API is commercially available through Trustworthy AI, Inc.14
9.5 Toolbox Competition
An academically-driven friendly competition for systems verification, called ARCH-COMP,
has been held annually since 2017 [118]. One category within the competition is the falsi-
fication of temporal logic specifications for cyber-physical systems. Falsification researchers
compare their tools against common benchmark problems and use the competition to track
state-of-the-art falsification tools.
As detailed in their 2019 report [118], S-TaLiRo, Breach, FalStar, and falsify partic-
ipated in the most recent competition. Six benchmark problems from the literature were
used to evaluate each tool. The tools were evaluated based on their falsification rate and
statistics on number of simulations required to find a falsifying trajectory. The outcome
of the 2019 competition showed that falsify had the most success, only requiring a single
simulation in certain benchmark problems. A notable emphasis on repeatability of results
was made during this recent competition. For future competitions, we suggest a comparison
metric for tool runtime to help assess relative computational timing complexities. Continu-
ing to mature the competition as more falsification methods arise will help drive discussion
around falsification tool design decisions. The competition’s benchmarks and results are
available online.15
9.6 Tools Discussion
The available tools can be categorized based on which aspects of the safety validation process
they implement, as described in section 2.2: falsification, most-likely failure analysis, and
failure probability estimation. Note that all of the available tools preform falsification as
their core task. Regarding academic tools, S-TaLiRo, Breach, FalStar, Rrt-Rex, and
falsify are falsification-only tools. As for commercial tools, Reactis and TestWeaver also fall
into the falsification-only category. TrustworthySearch API is the only commercial tool that
also preforms failure probability estimation and the AST Toolbox is the only academic tool
that preforms most-likely failure analysis. A full comparison is outlined in table 1.
As for solution techniques, the tools S-TaLiRo and Breach take a standard optimization-
based approach, while Rrt-Rex reformulates the falsification problem to solve it using path
planning algorithms. The AST Toolbox and falsify are based on reinforcement learning and
FalStar combines reinforcement learning and global optimization techniques for further re-
finement of the disturbance trajectory search. Common among all of the tools is an interface
to MATLAB, with a particular emphasis on testing Simulink models. This is evident in the
survey and can be attributed to an industrial emphasis on the use of MATLAB/Simulink
models for prototyping. A common component specific to academic falsification-only tools is
the use of temporal logic to specify system requirements—encoded in signal temporal logic
(STL) or metric temporal logic (MTL). Although expressive, requiring the strict usage of a
14. http://trustworthy.ai/
15. https://gitlab.com/goranf/ARCH-COMP
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Table 1: Black-box Safety Validation Tools
Safety Validation Problem
Tool Falsification
Most-Likely
Failure
Probability
Estimation Technique Source
S-TaLiRo [32] †* X · · Optimization Open
Breach [33] * X · · Optimization Open
Rrt-Rex [26] † X · · Path Planning Closed
FalStar [75] † * X · · Optimization, RL Open
falsify [69] † * X · · Reinforcement Learning Closed
AST Toolbox [22] X X · Reinforcement Learning Open
Reactis [129] X · · Proprietary Commercial
TestWeaver [131] X · · Proprietary Commercial
TrustworthySearch API [108] X · X Importance Sampling Commercial
* Competed in ARCH-COMP 2019 [118].
† Accepts system specification in temporal logic (STL or MTL).
temporal logic to encode system requirements could also limit the applicability of these tools.
With a common goal of ensuring that safety-critical systems are in fact safe, the availability
of these tools allows users to provide feedback given their specific use-cases and experience.
Continued tool and technique development is further encouraged by academically-driven
competitions such as ARCH-COMP [118].
10. Conclusion
With the rapid increase of safety-critical autonomous systems operating with humans, it is
imperative that we develop robust testing procedures that can ensure the safety of these
systems. Due to the high level of system complexity, a comprehensive testing procedure
must involve black-box validation strategies that seek to find failures of the autonomous
system. This work describes the problems of falsification (where a single failure example is
searched for), most-likely failure analysis (where the most likely failure is searched for), and
failure probability estimation (where we seek a good estimate of the likelihood of failure).
With these goals defined, we outline a wide array of algorithms that have been used
to accomplish these tasks. Global optimization, path planning, and reinforcement learning
algorithms have been used to find falsifying examples, while importance sampling methods
can be used to estimate the probability of failure even when it is close to zero. To address the
problem of scalability, we describe approaches for decomposing the safety validation problem
into more manageable components. We give a brief overview of the main applications for
black-box safety validation including autonomous driving, and autonomous flight. Finally,
we provide an overview of the existing tools that can be used to tackle these validation tasks.
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